How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts by Alter, Karen J. et al.
INTRODUCTION_12-19 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016 11:17 AM 
 
HOW CONTEXT SHAPES THE 
AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 
KAREN J. ALTER* 
LAURENCE R. HELFER** 
MIKAEL RASK MADSEN*** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is wide variation in the activity and influence of the nearly two dozen 
international courts (ICs) currently in existence. What factors lead some ICs to 
become active and prominent judicial bodies that cast a rule-of-law shadow 
beyond the courtroom, while others remain moribund or legally and politically 
sidelined? This introduction brings together experts of different ICs from the 
disciplines of law, political science, and sociology to collectively evaluate how 
institutional, political, and social contexts, and other exogenous factors 
influence the authority of ICs. 
We are interested in when a court’s formal legal authority evolves into 
authority in fact, or de facto authority. A key contribution of this introduction is 
the development of a framework to assess IC authority in fact that can be 
measured and assessed over time, across issue areas, in different countries, and 
in a disaggregated fashion. The contributors to this symposium, covering the 
major issue areas in which ICs operate, apply the authority metric to ten of the 
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most active ICs. Our primary goal in explicating this framework is to create a 
metric for assessing how legal, political, and social factors shape whether an IC 
has any de facto authority, the scope of that authority, and whether that 
authority encompasses the full range of its delegated jurisdiction. 
Part II analyzes the distinctive features of ICs as international institutions. 
We identify similarities common to all ICs and explain how ICs differ in 
important ways from other international institutions and from domestic courts. 
Part III defines IC authority and develops a framework that permits 
scholars to assess differences in authority in fact, within and across courts. 
Building on earlier scholarship, we create a measure of authority that reflects 
the practices—that is, the words and actions—of different sets of actors or 
audiences, who range from the litigants in a specific case to a broader legal field 
of, for example, attorneys, government officials, and scholars. This part also 
explains our decision to put aside questions of actors’ motives and beliefs, thus 
separating authority in fact from both sociological legitimacy and normative 
legitimacy. 
This symposium focuses on how contextual factors that are largely beyond 
the control of international judges facilitate or hinder whether an IC has any 
authority in fact and, if so, the extent of that authority. Accordingly, Part IV 
identifies a range of institutional, social, and political factors that shape IC 
authority. Part IV also previews how the contributors to this symposium 
analyze these contextual factors as applied to different ICs. Some of our 
contributors also consider the ability of judges to influence these contextual 
factors. 
Part V introduces a third dimension—IC power and effectiveness. We 
consider how far an IC’s authority extends across the full range of its subject 
matter competence and the states subject to its jurisdiction. Some ICs establish 
authority that is capacious in one sense—the number of actors who accept an 
obligation to comply—but confined in another sense—the acceptance exists 
only for a narrow issue area or a few countries. So long as a court’s authority is 
limited in this way, its political and legal shadow remains relatively small. An IC 
becomes more powerful and influential when its authority expands not only to a 
wider circle of constituencies, but also across a broader range of legal issues and 
countries.  
Part VI concludes by summarizing the major findings of this issue and by 
identifying promising avenues for future research. 
II 
ICS AS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACE DISTINCT 
CHALLENGES 
Our analysis of the authority of ICs engages with a growing literature on 
international authority that focuses on global governance institutions or that 
imports domestic concepts about institutions and legal processes into the 
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international realm.1 We not only build upon this literature, but also explain 
how ICs possess legal authority that differs in fundamental ways from that of 
other international institutions and from that of domestic courts. We begin by 
identifying how these differences create distinctive challenges for establishing, 
maintaining, and building IC legal authority.2 
In the most general terms, legal authority is a form of power characterized 
by a content-independent response to a command or order. The response is 
content-independent because the command is not tailored to the recipient’s 
interests. Legal authority is more complex than parental authority, but it is 
similar in that subjects comply because an authoritative actor has said what 
conduct is required.3 Most ICs acquire formal legal authority—what many call 
de jure authority—through an act of delegation4 from states that establishes a 
court’s formal right to rule on disputes falling within its jurisdiction. The legal 
right to rule exists even if the moral or ethical basis of that right remains 
contested. 
Many scholars assert that ICs possess unquestioned authority simply by 
virtue of this act of delegation. Although delegation confers formal powers on 
ICs and specifies their functions in important ways, delegation alone is 
insufficient. A formally constituted court may receive no cases even if violations 
of the law under its jurisdiction are widespread. Or it may issue decisions that 
the parties ignore or that have no legal or political impact. The core challenge 
that ICs face, therefore, is transforming formal legal authority into authority in 
fact, also known as de facto authority. 
The distinctive structures and functions of ICs shape how this 
transformation occurs. ICs “pre-exist the question that is to be decided,” in that 
judges are selected “through a mechanism that does not depend on the will of 
the litigating parties.”5 International judges also “sit on the body’s bench and 
decide a series of cases,” and their competence “derives from a public mandate 
[whose] outcome is, in essence, a public good.”6 Whereas diplomats strive for 
 
 1.  See infra Part III.A. 
 2.  Romano, Alter, and Shany state that ICs include six essential features: 
1. international governmental organizations, or bodies and procedures of international 
governmental organizations that . . . 2. hear cases where one of the parties is, or could be, a 
state or an international organization; 3. are composed of independent adjudicators, who . . . 4. 
decide the question(s) brought before them on the basis of international law . . . 5. following 
pre-determined rules of procedure, and . . .  6. [that] issue binding decisions. 
Cesare Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany, Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues 
and Players, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1, 6 (Cesare Romano, 
Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]. 
 3.  See Andrei Marmor, An Institutional Conception of Authority, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238–40, 
240 n.3 (2011).  
 4.  Observers may differ over the precise boundaries of an IC’s jurisdiction, but most agree that 
the act of delegation confers upon a court a circumscribed power to rule on disputes that fall within its 
jurisdiction. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2008 (discussing limits on international delegations). 
 5. Romano, Alter & Shany, supra note 2, at 5. 
 6. Id. IC decisions are public goods in the sense that they further public goals. 
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political compromise and arbitrators typically broker sustainable deals between 
the parties to a dispute, international judges are put in place to decide cases 
based on the reasoned interpretation and application of international law. In 
addition, international judges must consider how their decisions will be 
understood not only by today’s litigants, but also by potential future litigants 
and other legal actors who may be affected by their rulings.7 
These considerations distinguish courts from nonjudicial institutions. Most 
adjudication involves a plaintiff asserting a legal wrong and a defendant who is 
allegedly responsible for that wrong. The judges respond to the parties’ claims 
by speaking what the law requires, that is, by assessing competing legal 
arguments, clarifying ambiguities, labeling violations, and perhaps specifying a 
remedy. The contrast between ICs and other international bodies is striking. 
Few expect the UN Security Council to deliberate, vote, or adopt legal edicts in 
the ways that domestic legislatures do. Yet government officials, lawyers, civil 
society groups, and actual or potential litigants expect ICs to act like domestic 
courts in the sense of following predetermined rules of procedure and justifying 
their decisions on the basis of legal reasoning and argumentation. These 
similarities suggest one way for ICs to convert formal legal authority into 
authority in fact—by emulating their domestic counterparts and cultivating a 
constituency of legal professionals who act as litigants, scholars, judges, 
activists, politicians, and businessmen. 
Yet there are also important differences between national and international 
courts that may impede the transformation of an IC’s authority from de jure 
authority to authority in fact. ICs are often new institutions. As such, their 
rulings may conflict with, and seek to displace, well-established or assumed 
interpretations of legal rules or social norms. Displacing entrenched ideas and 
practices is always difficult. For international judges, doing so is especially 
challenging because ICs operate in a context of multiple authoritative 
decisionmakers. Formally, most ICs are the highest judicial interpreters of the 
international rules within their respective jurisdictions. In practice, however, 
other international and domestic legal and political actors may compete over 
their respective jurisdictions and over the meanings of legal texts. 
Domestic legal systems also have multiple levels of governance, but there is 
usually a shared understanding about which actors have the final word.8 In the 
United States, for example, federal legislative power coexists with state and 
local power, but established rules and procedures determine when state law 
must give way to federal law, and vice versa. ICs, by contrast, operate within a 
 
 7.  KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS 
8–10 (2014) [hereinafter NEW TERRAIN]. 
 8.  See generally, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD (2009) (discussing the 
issue of multiple authorities as a focus of debates over legal pluralism and legal polycentricity); Liesbet 
Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance, 97 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233 (2003) (discussing a range hierarchical and non-hierarchical multi-level 
governance forms). 
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context of international regime complexity that features “nested, partially 
overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically 
ordered.”9 This lack of a clearly established hierarchy arises because states often 
draft new treaties and create new institutions without specifying their 
relationship to preexisting ones, and because many treaties give national 
governments discretion to decide how to implement international obligations.10 
The result is that multiple actors within nested and parallel regimes can 
plausibly claim supremacy over overlapping legal domains. 
The plurality of authoritative institutions and decisionmakers also shapes 
the understandings and expectations of domestic audiences. There are many 
reasons that ICs may fail to meet these understandings and expectations. 
Lawyers, government officials, NGOs, and academics often have deeply held 
ideas about national sovereignty, the place of international law in national legal 
orders, and the content of international rules. Some of these actors may not 
understand an IC’s formal authority, may see IC rulings as strange and foreign, 
or may believe that IC rulings have no domestic legal effect. Divergences in 
legal practices among member states complicate this picture, because an IC’s 
choice of one national practice or creation of a hybrid practice may introduce 
unfamiliar concepts to audiences in other countries. As entrenched as these 
ideas and practices may be, they must sometimes be displaced before domestic 
audiences will accept an IC’s de facto authority. The essential point linking 
these examples is that actors can insist that they respect the rule of law and, at 
the same time, disregard IC rulings by relying on competing authoritative legal 
interpretations. 
III 
THE VARIABLE AUTHORITY OF ICS 
This part explains how we ascertain IC authority in fact, operationalizing the 
concept by reference to the practices of different audiences that interact with 
ICs. Our goal is to create a practicable definition that reflects the real world in 
which ICs operate. We specify varying types of de facto authority that enable 
comparisons within a single court in different issue areas or over time, as well as 
between ICs. We conclude by identifying the indicators that we expect to 
observe when a court possesses different types of authority in fact. 
 
 9.  Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 PERSP. 
ON POL. 13, 13 (2009). 
 10.  To domestic observers, this cacophony may appear as inefficient as it is convoluted. Yet 
scholars of international institutions have identified a number of advantages to maintaining this 
complexity. Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, for example, argue that a complex of climate 
change regimes is actually a better outcome than a single international climate change regime. Robert 
O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 
(2011). See also Hooghe & Marks, Unraveling the Central State, supra note 8, at 235–39 (discussing the 
benefits of flexible governance models). 
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A. The De Facto Authority of ICs 
Many scholars analyze ICs by evaluating the particular design features of 
courts, by reviewing the quality of their reasoning, or by measuring state 
compliance with their decisions.11 In contrast, we assess the de facto authority of 
ICs by examining the practices of key audiences. Judges control neither the 
sword nor the purse. They cannot coerce litigants or other actors to behave in 
particular ways. Instead, ICs issue decisions that identify violations of 
international rules and create a legally binding obligation to comply with the 
court’s judgments interpreting those rules. Whether such compliance actually 
occurs, however, depends upon the responses of the different audiences 
described in part III.B.12 
We are interested in the statements and conduct of these audiences. In 
particular, we ask whether one or more audiences recognize, by their words, 
actions, or both, that IC rulings are legally binding and engage in actions that 
push toward giving full effect to those rulings. To facilitate comparisons within 
and across ICs, this metric is intentionally simple. While the empirical articles in 
the symposium do consider motives and reasons, our metric of authority, which 
measures observed practices, is agnostic as to why an audience recognizes a 
court’s authority and to the subjective beliefs that underlie that recognition. 
Our approach thereby differs from what sometimes is labeled as sociological 
legitimacy, which focuses on how actors’ perceptions may legitimize courts or 
how such perceptions allow courts to justify their practices and power.13 
Perhaps most importantly, we do not ask whether IC authority is 
normatively legitimate. We are not alone in separating authority from 
legitimacy. Recent scholarship on international institutions also counsels against 
conflating the two concepts.14 We defend this separation on the following 
grounds. First, ICs have an express legal competence usually based on a 
consensual act of delegation from states.15 For this reason, their legal right to 
rule is generally less contentious than that of other international institutions 
whose decisions purport to bind states. Second, we seek a straightforward and 
measurable yardstick to evaluate how a range of contextual factors shapes de 
facto authority of ICs via an analysis of audiences’ practices toward ICs. 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of European Style International Courts, 35 West 
Eur. Pol. 135, 135 (2012). 
 12.  This approach follows Andrei Marmor and Michael Zurn et al., who ask whether international 
institutions meet the empirical condition of actually having authority. See Andrei Marmor, supra note 
3, at 252–55; Michael Zurn, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and its 
Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69, 74 (2012). 
 13.  See Mikael R. Madsen, Sociological Approaches to International Courts, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 388, 392–93 (discussing the difference between perception and 
justification, on the one hand, and practices and authority, on the other). 
 14.  Birgit Peters & Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Turn to Authority Beyond States, 4 TRANSNAT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 315, 316 (2013); Marmor, supra note 3, at  238; Zurn, supra note 12, at 70, 73. 
 15.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, created pursuant to the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, are exceptions to the formal state consent to the act of delegation that establishes an IC. 
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Although it is interesting to study subjective motivations and reasons why 
actors accept or reject IC rulings, observing practices does not necessarily shed 
light on this question.16 Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, we agree with 
Peters and Schaffer that 
[m]any conceptions of authority link it so closely to legitimacy as to make “legitimate 
authority” tautological, and the two notions virtually indistinguishable. However, 
embedding legitimacy in the definition of authority may be both analytically and 
empirically problematic, especially if you want to theorize how international authority 
relates to resistance, mobilization and contestation . . . . First, if legitimacy and 
authority are two sides of a coin, then the more authority an institution has, the more 
legitimate it must be. This runs counter to experience: sometimes institutions acquire 
authority over new issues without necessarily being seen as more legitimate by all 
actors. Second, the [conflation of authority and legitimacy] seems to deny the 
existence of illegitimate authority—which might seem troubling for both normative 
and conceptual reasons . . . .
17
 
Applying this insight to ICs, we thus recognize that a court can do 
everything normative theorists might expect of a legitimate international 
judicial body and still not have authority in fact. The converse scenario—
authority in fact, without normative legitimacy—is also possible. 
Our measure of de facto IC authority has two key components—(1) 
recognizing an obligation to comply with court rulings and (2) engaging in 
meaningful action pushing toward giving full effect to those rulings. This is a 
conjunctive standard that is assessed by examining the practices of the relevant 
actors.18 A simple public statement that a judgment is legally binding is, without 
more, inadequate. Equally insufficient is conduct that happens to conform to a 
judgment. 
For states that are the defendants in most IC litigation, the recognition 
element can be either an express statement of intent to comply, or the implied 
acceptance that accompanies a government’s decision to implement or give 
effect to a court’s judgment. For non-parties, such as civil society groups or 
opposition politicians, recognition occurs when actors refer to IC decisions as 
legally binding when pushing states to conform to the court’s judgment. 
The meaningful action element is more difficult to gauge. For the losing 
state, full adherence to an IC judgment is, of course, sufficient. But it is also too 
exacting. Many international judicial rulings involve complex issues of law and 
policy that implicate different branches or levels of government—executive, 
 
 16.  Focusing on practices avoids the obvious problem of how to measure subjective perceptions 
and motivations that cannot be directly observed. There may well be discrepancies between actors’ 
internal, subjective views of IC decisions and the externally observable actions taken by, for example, 
government officials.   
 17.  Peters & Schaffer, supra note 14, at 334 (discussing Zurn, Binder & Ecker-Ehrhardt, supra 
note 12). 
 18.  To reiterate, we are observing behavior—what actors do—without questioning the motivation 
or reason for their actions. If an actor demonstrates some recognition of an obligation to comply, the 
first criteria is met. We do not inquire into the deeper normative and constitutive forces that may 
contribute to this recognition. 
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legislative, and judicial; national, state, and local.19 Coordinating responses 
among these multiple actors can be difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes 
impossible. In addition, many IC rulings may require social mobilization to be 
given full effect. To take account of these complex realities, our framework not 
only considers the practices of the litigants but also those of a wider set of 
participants in the legal process. For example, actors who are not a party to the 
dispute—such as NGOs, bar associations, and scholars—take meaningful action 
when they identify the specific steps needed to implement a judgment, or when 
they urge governments to change their behavior to preempt future IC litigation.  
The response to the 2004 International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment in 
the Avena case illustrates these complexities and further clarifies our dual 
criteria for IC de facto authority. In Avena, the ICJ ordered the United States 
to provide “review and reconsideration” of the convictions and sentences of 
fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row whose consular rights it had violated.20 
The United States disagreed with the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Rights and the remedies the Court ordered. Indeed, 
the United States withdrew its consent to ICJ jurisdiction to hear future 
disputes relating to the Vienna Convention.21 Yet President George W. Bush 
also issued a “memorandum” asserting that “the United States will discharge its 
international obligations under [the Avena judgment] by having State courts 
give effect to the decision . . . in cases filed by the [fifty-one] Mexican nationals 
addressed in that decision.”22 
We view President Bush’s directive to state courts as both a consequential 
step toward compliance and a recognition of the ICJ’s authority. We do so 
notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court later held that the Avena 
judgment was legally binding only at the international level and that the 
President’s directive was unconstitutional.23 The Supreme Court’s decision 
prevented all fifty-one Mexican nationals from receiving automatic review and 
reconsideration of their convictions and sentences. Nevertheless, a few state 
courts and officials have relied on Avena to grant such relief and to commute 
the death sentence of at least one defendant.24 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American 
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 508 (2011) [hereinafter Courts 
Resisting Courts] (noting inverse correlation between number of branches of government involved in 
injunctive order and implementation of IC decision). 
 20.  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 559, ¶ 121 (Mar. 31). 
 21.  Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2005, at A16. 
 22.  Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 
28, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
 23.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008). According to the Supreme Court, only a 
federal statute could compel state courts to comply with the ICJ judgment. Id. at 496. The Avena Case 
Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008) and other bills introduced to require 
compliance have yet to be enacted by Congress.  
 24.  See Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012); see also 
Sandra Babcock, The Limits of International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the International Court 
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Although the ICJ’s judgment is more than a decade old, we may not have 
seen the final act in the Avena saga. The Avena ruling has influenced behavior 
beyond the individuals directly implicated by the case. The federal government 
has taken steps to improve compliance with the consular notifications by state 
and local officials.25 And Congress may yet enact legislation to implement the 
ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention, an outcome urged by scholars 
and by the Council of Europe that would bring the United States into full 
compliance, but without addressing the fact that the convictions of some Avena 
litigants were not reviewed prior to their execution.26 
This example nicely illustrates that IC authority can exist notwithstanding 
disagreements about compliance among different branches or levels of 
government, and even in the face of overt rejections of IC rulings by some 
domestic actors. It also highlights the challenges of analyzing IC authority in the 
short term. Some will conclude from this discussion that the ICs we view as 
authoritative have only minimal legal and political influence. We return to this 
issue in part V. 
B. IC Authority Assessed by the Practices of Different Audiences 
Our framework identifies five types of de facto authority that correspond to 
the practices of different IC audiences, which we illustrate with examples from 
this symposium. The first type is no authority in fact. Courts with no authority in 
fact have formal jurisdiction from the initial act of delegation, but, despite 
identified violations, litigants do not file complaints with the IC, and cases that 
the court does decide are generally ignored. For example, Gathii finds that the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) currently has no de facto authority 
among businesses, traders, and other economic actors in the East African 
Community, an audience envisioned as one of the court’s principal 
constituencies.27 
 
of Justice in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 183, 187–93 (2012) (discussing case law).  
 25.  See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 
MANUAL 43 (4th ed. 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNAtrainingresources/CNA 
Manual_Feb2014.pdf (instructing federal, state, and local law enforcement officials on actions required 
to comply with the VCCR “to ensure that the United States meets its international obligations”).  
 26.  Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong., 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6481; see also Jacob Katz Kogan, ASIL Presidents Call on 
Congress to Pass Legislation to Ensure Compliance with the Avena Judgment, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
REPORTER (July 18, 2008, 12:42 PM), http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/07/asil-presidents-call-on-
congress-to.html; Council of Europe, The death penalty in Council of Europe member and observer 
states: a violation of human rights (Jan. 3, 2011) (urging the U.S. Congress to “pass legislation enabling 
those Mexican nationals condemned to death without having been provided with the consular 
assistance . . . to be retried following the correct procedures”), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/ 
Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=12590&lang=en. 
 27.  Gathii’s conclusion is based on interviews with potential EACJ business interlocutors who 
noted widespread violations of EAC economic rules but see the court as unhelpful in addressing these 
violations. In Gathii’s view, the lack of final EACJ decisions relevant to private businesses does not 
meet our definition of narrow authority. James Thuo Gathii, Variation in the Use of Subregional 
Integration Courts between Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of 
Justice, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 60–61. 
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The second type, narrow authority, exists when only the parties to a 
particular dispute take meaningful steps toward compliance with a court’s 
ruling. Narrow legal authority meets the minimum conditions for IC authority 
in fact—the recognition of a legal obligation and the need for a consequential 
response. The court’s authority remains limited, however, because it does not 
extend beyond the litigants to the dispute. As Caserta and Madsen explain 
regarding the early rulings of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) interpreting 
CARICOM law, only the parties to individual cases recognized the court’s 
decisions as legally binding and as requiring consequential steps toward 
compliance.28 
Narrow authority falls short of what most observers expect of a court—
namely, the ability to cast a larger legal shadow that affects the behavior and 
decisions of other similarly-situated actors. A court achieves intermediate legal 
authority only when those actors also recognize the two elements of IC 
authority described above. The audiences in this intermediate range of 
authority include potential future litigants as well as government officials 
charged with implementing international rules as interpreted by the court, such 
as executive branch officials, administrative agency officials, and judges. This 
audience collectively constitutes what Alter labels as an IC’s “compliance 
partners”—the actors who have the power to decide whether to comply with 
international law as interpreted by the IC.29 
IC influence becomes more politically consequential at this stage. Our 
conception of intermediate authority resembles Marmor’s idea of “practical 
authority,” defined as the power “to determine, within a certain range of 
options, what types of normative change [an international institution] can 
introduce, how to make those changes, who is subject to them, often also how to 
monitor compliance, and how to respond to non-compliance.”30 Such authority 
can exist even if the subject matter of adjudicated cases remains highly 
circumscribed. For example, Dickerson explains that the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Commercial Law in Africa (OHADA) Court, which 
interprets uniform regional commercial laws in West Africa, has intermediate 
authority vis-à-vis a subset of firms that operate in the formal economy and 
resolve their business disputes before the OHADA Court or in the shadow of 
the law as interpreted by the Court. 
The third category, extensive authority, exists when an IC’s audience 
expands beyond its compliance partners to encompass a broader range of 
actors, including civil society groups, bar associations, industries, and legal 
academics. ICs with extensive authority consistently shape law and politics for 
one or more legal issues within their jurisdiction. This level of authority is 
 
 28.  Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and Common Law: The 
Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and Post-Colonial 
Legacies, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 103–08.   
 29.  ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 53.  
 30.  Marmor, supra note 3 at 243. 
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largely analogous to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of a “legal field”—the space 
where diverse actors accept the legal force of the law but may contest the 
meaning, legitimacy, and importance of different interpretations of the 
law.31Applied to our object of inquiry, extensive authority is recognized in the 
practices of this wider audience. Yet although these actors acknowledge the 
court and its rulings as authoritative, they may still contest the precise meaning 
of the law. 
One version of extensive authority is captured by the “island of effective 
international adjudication,” built by the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), in 
the intellectual property (IP) issue area. According to Helfer, Alter, and 
Guerzovich, the ATJ has extensive authority over IP disputes because the 
practices of a wide range of actors—the industries that depend on IP rights; the 
businesses that litigate IP disputes; and the lawyers, domestic agencies, national 
judges, and legal scholars who specialize in IP—reveal habitual acceptance of 
ATJ rulings interpreting Andean IP law.32 Very different examples of extensive 
authority are the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), discussed by Kelemen and Madsen in this issue.33 
These courts consistently shape law and politics across most of their respective 
issue area domains and the states parties subject to their jurisdiction. We return 
to this topic in part IV. 
A final level—one that we do not consider in this symposium—is popular 
authority, which exists when recognition of IC rulings extends beyond the legal 
field to encompass the public in general.34 Given their relatively young age, new 
 
 31.  Bourdieu does not argue that legitimacy exists within a legal field. Rather, his primary claim is 
that within this field, actors with different interests, viewpoints, and power-endowments struggle to 
impose their preferred definition of legitimacy. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology 
of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805–53 (1987); Yves Dezalay & Mikael R. Madsen, The Force 
of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. AND SOC. 
SCI. 433, 435 (2012). 
 32.  Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective 
International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean 
Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2009). In other legal domains within the ATJ’s jurisdiction, 
however, the Tribunal has, at best, narrow authority. It has issued far fewer rulings and has failed to 
develop relationships with potential litigants and compliance partners. Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. 
Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors: Understanding the Preliminary Ruling 
Reference Patterns in the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871, 897–900 (2009). 
 33.  R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First Century, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 117; Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority of 
the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration 
and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 141. 
 34.  Constitutional and supreme courts in both Germany and the United States arguably enjoy 
such popular authority. There are no studies of IC popular authority using our metrics. Existing studies 
focus on the relationship between public opinion and legitimacy, finding that some high courts garner 
more positive public feelings than national legislatures or executives. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, 
James L. Gibson & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 343, 343 (1998). For studies of public support for ICs, see generally Erik Voeten, Public Opinion 
and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2013); Linda Camp 
Keith, Banks Miller & Rachel McGuire, Second-Order Evaluations of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 3 J. L. & COURTS 67 (2015). 
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ICs are yet to reach the stage where publics understand, let alone recognize, the 
authority of ICs. Moreover, the specialized mandates of some courts may limit 
the extent to which publics ever recognize IC authority. 
Figure 1 illustrates the levels of IC authority that are our primary focus. The 
white outer circle represents the court’s de jure authority as specified via a 
formal act of delegation. This delegation is a precondition for the existence of 
any type of authority in fact. When an IC has no narrow, intermediate, or 
extensive de facto authority—that is, when no audience recognizes IC rulings as 
obligatory or undertakes meaningful actions that push toward compliance with 
the ruling—there would be no shaded circles within the outer white circle. 
Figure 1 displays the three levels of de facto authority as nested, suggesting 
that a court first gains narrow, then intermediate, then extensive authority. But 
as we explain in the discussion that follows, we intend no teleology by this 
diagram. The three circles of de facto authority may not be nested; an IC could 
have extensive authority but lack narrow and intermediate authority. This is 
arguably the case for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and for the 
OHADA Court, as discussed by, respectively, Vinjamuri and Dickerson in this 
symposium.35 We also accept that IC authority can contract as well as expand—
a prospect that Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig highlight in their study of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body’s “extensive but fragile” 
authority,36 and one that Madsen addresses when he discusses recent debates 
and reforms of the ECtHR.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35.  Claire Moore Dickerson, The OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration: Exogenous 
Forces Contributing to Its Influence, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 63; Leslie Vinjamuri, 
The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
2016, at 275. Another example of intermediate authority without narrow authority is Ireland’s 
modification of its prisoner voting laws in response to a politically contentious ECtHR judgment 
against the United Kingdom, which has publicly rejected the judgment and refused to comply. 
Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from 
LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 83 (2014). 
 36.  Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the 
WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 237.   
 37.  Madsen, supra note 33, at 167–75.   
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Figure 1: Three Types of Authority In Fact 
 
 
C. Indicators of IC Authority In Fact 
This subpart identifies indicators of whether an IC has narrow, intermediate, 
extensive authority, or some combination thereof, using examples from 
different courts and types of cases. The empirical articles in the symposium 
explore many other indicators. Pinpointing the precise level of authority 
matters less for our framework than identifying movement across the types and 
variation within and across ICs. 
Indicators of narrow legal authority: If the losing party publicly 
acknowledges an obligation to comply with an IC ruling, narrow legal authority 
is likely satisfied. The requirement for a consequential response is met by taking 
some meaningful step in response to the ruling, such as paying compensation, 
reviewing or revising challenged laws and policies, reopening judicial 
proceedings, and so forth. We leave open the time frame for these actions and 
accept that different actors, branches, or levels of government may disagree 
about what compliance with an IC ruling entails.38 
Indicators of intermediate authority: IC authority remains narrow if, 
notwithstanding compliance in individual cases, there is general disregard for 
international rules and few adversely affected actors bother to challenge this 
 
 38.  For example, in 2014 the ICJ issued judgments against Japan, involving a treaty banning 
commercial whaling, and against Chile concerning its maritime boundary with Peru. Political leaders in 
both countries publicly professed their intent to comply, albeit gradually, in the case against Chile and 
only partially in the suit against Japan. Martin Facklerapril, Japan Plans to Resume Whaling Program, 
With Changes to Address Court Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04 
/19/world/asia/japan-says-it-will-resume-whaling-off-antarctica.html?_r=0; Ryan Dube, Peru, Chile 
Agree to ‘Gradually’ Implement Sea-Border Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052702304428004579353071019333430.  
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noncompliance in court. Evidence that multiple litigants are filing complaints 
suggests the beginnings of intermediate authority because it indicates that a 
wider group of actors recognizes the IC as a forum to promote their legal rights. 
Intermediate authority is solidified when IC rulings influence the behavior 
of potential litigants in similar cases. This is indicated by the revision of laws 
and practices to preempt litigation as well as a court’s lengthening shadow in 
discussions among lawyers and clients. For example, Huneeus explains that 
Colombian officials anticipated what the Inter-American Court might rule 
regarding an indigenous land rights case, and Colombian judges regularly refer 
to Inter-American Court jurisprudence when considering cases involving 
criminal, family, and administrative law.39 Scholars have observed similar 
patterns in the ECJ and the ECtHR.40 
Indicators of extensive authority: For ICs with extensive authority, one often 
finds textbooks and scholarly treatises on IC case law; an established bar that 
appears before the court; NGOs using international litigation; and a diverse 
range of judges, practitioners, and officials who draw on IC jurisprudence in 
their day-to-day activities. Extensive authority is also revealed by the regular 
invocation of IC decisions or potential litigation in legal and policy discussions, 
with government officials referencing the prospects of IC review as they debate 
and develop policy proposals. Extensive authority often requires that an IC 
fulfill the requirements of narrow and intermediate authority. But extensive 
authority does not require universal acquiescence; it is compatible not only with 
the rejection of authority in fact by some litigants but also with resistance to 
such authority, a reality that that Vinjamuri discusses in her analysis of the 
ICC’s authority.41 
Legal fields are characterized by contestations of ideas and clashes of power 
and interests. Indeed, the more an international institution exercises its right to 
make collectively binding decisions, the more likely it will engender politicized 
disagreement.42 As applied to ICs, this insight may be reflected in the rejection 
of narrow or intermediate authority by some litigants for a court that has 
otherwise made an indelible mark on a legal field. For example, Shaffer, Elsig, 
and Puig explain how a wide range of actors in the legal field of international 
trade law—including trade ministry officials, industry associations, law firms, 
 
 39.  Alexandra Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varied Authority, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 191 [hereinafter Constitutional Lawyers]. 
 40.  For examples of states that preemptively modified their laws and policies following rulings 
from these ICs against other states that had adopted similar laws and policies, see, for example., 
RACHEL CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION 
AND GOVERNANCE 17–23 (2007); Helfer & Voeten, supra note 35, at 81. Regarding the ECtHR, 
British authorities already in the 1980s started screening all new legislation for compliance with the 
European Convention of Human Rights to avoid new cases in Strasbourg. Mikael Rask Madsen, 
France, the UK and “Boomerang” of the Internationalization of Human Rights (1945–2000), in HUMAN 
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL 
CONTEXT 57, 81 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004). 
 41.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 281–83. 
 42.  See Zurn et al., supra note 12, at 87–88. 
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and scholars—quickly recognized WTO Appellate Body rulings as 
authoritative, even as some governments continued to enact domestic laws that 
unquestionably violate WTO rules.43 Extensive authority does, however, help 
international judges weather even heated contestations about specific rulings, 
such as the resistance to the ECJ by Hungary’s increasingly authoritarian 
government that Kelemen describes.44 
We asked our contributors to compare the authority of ICs across time, 
actors, or the legal domains that fall under the IC’s formal jurisdiction. Table 1 
summarizes the comparisons, and the corresponding types of authority. Perhaps 
most importantly, Table 1 reveals that IC authority is not static, and that ICs 
with extensive authority do not always have narrow or intermediate authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43.  Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 267–72. 
 44.  Kelemen, supra note 33, at 131; see also Madsen, supra note 33, at 167–75 (discussing the 
ECtHR and the challenges it is facing, particularly in Russia). 
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Table 1: Comparisons of IC Authority In Fact across Contexts 
EACJ 
 
Economic law 
 
No authority in fact 
 
Human rights law 
 
Emerging extensive authority absent 
intermediate authority 
 
OHADA 
Court 
 
Formal economy 
 
Narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority at a thin elite level 
 
 
Informal economy 
 
No authority in fact 
CCJ 
 
Founding period (2005–2010) 
 
Narrow authority for CARICOM cases; 
intermediate authority for appeals of 
national rulings. 
 
 
Recent period (2011–2014) 
 
Emerging intermediate and extensive 
authority for CARICOM cases and 
appeals of national rulings 
ECJ 
 
Pre-enlargement EU (1970s–1990s) 
  
Narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority 
 
 
Post-enlargement EU (2000–present) 
 
Authority continues, but recent decrease 
of narrow authority in few new accession 
states 
ECtHR 
 
Cold War Era (1950s–1989) 
 
Narrow and intermediate authority 
 
Post–Cold War Era (1990–2014) 
 
Narrow and intermediate authority; 
Extensive authority may be retracting in 
some member states 
IACtHR 
 
Colombia 
 
Narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority 
 
 
Chile 
 
Narrow and intermediate authority 
 
Venezuela 
 
Narrow authority to no authority in fact 
 
ICJ 
(vis-à-vis 
Islamic law 
states) 
 
Territorial disputes 
 
Narrow authority in litigated cases 
 
Diplomatic immunity disputes 
 
No authority in fact 
WTO 
GATT era 
 
Narrow authority 
 
 
WTO era 
 
Narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority alongside growing fragility 
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ICC 
 
Self-referrals 
 
Extensive authority without 
intermediate authority; spotty narrow 
authority 
 
 
Security Council & proprio moto referrals 
 
Extensive authority without intermediate 
or narrow authority 
International 
Criminal 
Tribunals 
(ICTs) 
 
 
Nuremberg Tribunals 
 
Narrow alongside growing 
intermediate authority 
 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia 
 
Narrow authority and some intermediate 
authority 
 
International Criminal Court 
 
Extensive authority alongside declining 
narrow and intermediate authority 
 
 
IV 
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT SHAPE IC AUTHORITY 
We next turn to the contexts in which ICs operate. We are interested in how 
a range of contextual factors beyond the immediate control of judges influence 
the creation, expansion, or dissipation of IC legal authority. In particular, we 
ask how different contextual factors enable some courts to gain different levels 
of authority, whereas others with similar or different access rules, mandates, 
and supporters have no authority in fact, remain static, or even experience 
contractions in authority. 
The discussion is divided into three analytically distinct categories. 
Institution-specific context captures features that are distinctive to a particular 
IC, such as its design and subject matter mandate. These features most often 
vary across courts, but there may also be variation within a single IC over time 
or across issue areas. Constituencies context analyzes issues related to IC 
interlocutors, including government officials, judges, attorneys, legal experts, 
and civil society groups. Global, regional, and local political context considers 
how political dynamics at these different levels affect IC authority. Given that 
the empirical articles in this symposium all analyze complex processes 
concerning multiple types of authority and specific levels of audiences and 
politics, our discussion is only illustrative rather than exhaustive and points to 
the overlap and interdependence across different categories of context. We first 
review the contextual factors in each category and then briefly consider how IC 
judges themselves may seek to influence these contextual factors. 
A. Institution-Specific Contexts 
Institution-specific contextual factors relate to a single IC and may impact 
the ways in which audiences relate to that court. We focus in particular on 
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access rules and jurisdiction, alternatives to international litigation, and 
variations in subject matter mandates. Although distinctive to particular courts, 
these factors often vary across and within ICs in ways that may enhance or 
impede connections with different audiences. 
1. Access Rules and Jurisdiction 
The first permanent ICs were interstate dispute settlement bodies created to 
adjudicate conflicts between states with the consent of both parties.45 This 
model of international adjudication—what Alter has labeled “old style” ICs—
allows only states to initiate litigation, often only for a specific case or 
controversy.46 Old-style ICs today occupy a less prominent place in international 
adjudication than they did in previous decades, but they remain an important 
venue for some countries and in some issue areas, as illustrated by Powell’s 
comparison of the differing authority of the ICJ—the canonical old-style 
court—in territorial and immunity disputes involving Islamic law states.47 
Beginning after World War II, and accelerating at the end of the Cold War, 
states created new-style ICs whose compulsory jurisdiction is often a mandatory 
component of a treaty regime of which the court is an integral part.48 It is more 
difficult to block litigation when an IC has compulsory jurisdiction. 
Negotiations are thus more likely to take place in the shadow of adjudication, 
increasing the bargaining leverage of plaintiffs whose claims are supported by 
the law. Additionally, because plaintiffs can initiate litigation without the 
express consent of states, we expect ICs with compulsory jurisdiction to be 
busier. To the extent that the losing parties respect IC rulings against them, 
compulsory jurisdiction may help ICs gain narrow authority. Such jurisdiction 
may even be necessary for intermediate and extensive authority. 
Multiple access points, especially for nonstate actors, are another hallmark 
of new style ICs. This design innovation was first introduced with the creation 
of the ECJ and the ECtHR, two European courts that have since served as 
models for economic and human rights courts in other regions. For the ECJ-
style ICs, access points include preliminary references from lower and apex 
national courts, direct access by private parties, and the investigation and 
pursuit of complaints by commissions or secretariats. For the ECtHR-style 
tribunals, private litigants must first exhaust domestic remedies and then file 
international petitions, either directly with the IC or via the intermediary of a 
human rights commission. In addition, in both models states can, although 
 
 45.  Mary Ellen O’Connell & Lenore VanderZee, The History of International Adjudication, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 42, 55–58. 
 46.  ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 83.   
 47.  Emilia Justyna Powell, Islamic Law States and the Authority of the International Court of 
Justice: Territorial Sovereignty and Diplomatic Immunity, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 
209.   
 48.  ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 81–85; Cesare P. Romano, From the Consensual to the 
Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 791, 808–11 (2007).  
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seldom do, initiate litigation against other countries alleging breaches of the 
relevant international agreements.49 
Multiple access points expand the opportunities for ICs to acquire all three 
levels of authority in fact. When only governments choose whether to file suit, 
the decision to litigate is often influenced by political and diplomatic concerns 
unrelated to the merits of a case.50 In addition, multiple access points allow 
nonstate actors—such as private litigants, supranational commissions, or 
prosecutors—to use IC litigation to circumvent domestic legal blockages. As a 
result, disputes that governments and national judges might prefer to handle 
quietly behind closed doors or reserve for future bargaining are more likely to 
see the light of day. Litigating these cases also allows ICs to “gain[] political 
capital from a growing caseload by demonstrably performing a needed 
function.”51 The emergence of this positive feedback loop may be an indicator 
that an IC is developing intermediate authority. 
The importance of access rules and jurisdiction is revealed when 
governments restructure ICs, widen their subject matter jurisdiction, or increase 
the number of state parties. A number of articles in this issue investigate the 
effect of IC design features and design changes. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig 
compare the many blockages to dispute settlement under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the WTO panels and Appellate 
Body, demonstrating that the GATT system struggled to develop narrow 
authority whereas the WTO system almost immediately gained extensive 
authority.52 Vinjamuri compares ICC cases referred by the UN Security Council 
to self-referrals by states and finds that the mode of referral neither enhances 
nor hinders the ICC’s narrow authority in the case at hand.53  
2. Alternatives to International Litigation 
Although wider access rules and jurisdiction are likely to increase the flow 
of cases to court, the existence of attractive alternatives to international 
litigation may siphon away cases and diminish opportunities to build 
connections to litigants and other audiences. The attractiveness of these 
alternatives varies widely across ICs. The more attractive the alternatives, the 
fewer cases a court is likely to receive and the less likely it can establish any 
level of authority in fact. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation, negotiation, 
 
 49.  ALTER, NEW TERRAIN, supra note 7, at 87–94. 
 50.  David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 
79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 779 (1994) (“Notwithstanding a meritorious legal claim . . . , one State may be 
reluctant to initiate a third-party dispute settlement process against another State for fear of 
jeopardizing other strategic or economic bilateral relationships.”). 
 51.  Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: 
Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 482 (2000); see also Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization 
and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUDIES 147, 157 (1999) (discussing how switching 
from dyadic to trilateral dispute adjudication fuels norm creation).  
 52.  Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 241–55. 
 53.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 280–86.  
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mediation, and arbitration, often offer appealing alternatives to international 
adjudication because they are generally faster, less formal, less expensive, and 
allow the parties to choose the decisionmakers and whether the decisions 
should be made public.54 These alternatives can accomplish litigant objectives, 
but their use can hinder the ability of ICs to gain de facto authority by 
interpreting legal rules and issuing public, reasoned assessments of the litigants’ 
competing claims. 
The attractiveness of litigation alternatives may also depend upon whether 
the party most likely to file suit is a state, a commission or prosecutor, or a 
private party. States involved in multiple disputes and policy negotiations may 
have greater room to negotiate out-of-court settlements. Private actors often 
have less bargaining leverage than public actors, but they too may have viable 
alternatives to IC litigation. Private actors may pursue cases in domestic courts 
or use political connections to broker a favorable resolution of disputes. For 
example, Gathii finds that such alternatives are the primary reason that 
businesses do not turn to the EACJ to challenge violations of East Africa 
Community free trade rules.55 If, however, domestic courts are sympathetic to 
governments or if private parties lack political connections, international 
adjudication may be the only viable option. 
A different type of alternative exists for disputes that can be litigated before 
more than one IC.56 The ability to forum shop may enhance a plaintiff’s 
negotiating leverage by allowing him or her to select a court that is more likely 
to rule favorably. The existence of multiple venues may also make it more 
difficult for any single IC to establish narrow or intermediate authority.57 In 
addition, prospective litigants and compliance partners may be wary of 
interacting with or shaping their behavior in response to an IC when other 
tribunals can opine on the meaning of the same or similar international rules 
but reach a different result.58 
3. Subject Matter Competence 
All other things equal, ICs have more opportunities to gain authority in fact 
when alternatives to litigation are few, the demand for international 
 
 54.  See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION 46–106 (1992). 
 55.  Gathii, supra note 27, at 45–54. 
 56.  Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 289 (1999).  
 57.  For example, maritime boundary disputes tend to be adjudicated by the ICJ, depriving the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea of opportunities to develop its authority in this area. In 
addition, states sometimes relitigate cases decided in the MERCOSUR and NAFTA dispute settlement 
systems before WTO panels and the Appellate Body. See Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduard Salles, Forum 
Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) concerns, (Im)Possible solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 77, 77–79 (2009). In Africa, suits relating to Senegal’s refusal to prosecute or extradite former 
Chadian President Hissein Habré have been filed before the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the ECOWAS Court, and the ICJ. See Sangeeta Shah, Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 354–56, 355 n.22 (2013).  
 58.  Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 
411, 440–44 (2008). 
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adjudication is high, or both situations exist simultaneously. The attractiveness 
of these alternatives and the demand for litigation are likely to vary with the 
subject matter of the cases that an IC can hear.59 
For some issue areas there may be overlapping and conflicting legal rules or 
multiple legal and political venues in which litigants can pursue their objectives. 
For example, Gathii, Caserta and Madsen, and Dickerson suggest that 
economic actors may have more alternatives to choose from, including political 
or informal means of resolving disputes. In contrast, Huneeus’s analysis of the 
changing political climate in Latin America suggests that the options to remedy 
human rights violations are more limited. During the era of military 
dictatorships, and in Venezuela more recently, the Inter-American system was a 
plausible venue in which to pursue human rights complaints. Yet in countries 
with vibrant neoconstitutionalist movements, domestic judges and government 
officials often cite Inter-American rulings against other states to justify changes 
in their own laws and policies, preempting regional litigation and giving the 
IACtHR intermediate authority.60 For international criminal law, the goal of the 
international criminal system is to generate alternatives to ICC adjudication. 
Yet as Vinjamuri suggests, a lack of faith in the ICC may generate alternatives 
to ICC litigation that undermine a court’s authority.61 
Another way that subject matter may affect IC authority relates to the 
political salience of disputes. The dockets of some ICs are dominated by 
technical or low-politics cases primarily of interest to specialized groups of 
litigants, lawyers, and experts. ICs that adjudicate disputes about the ownership 
of patents, such as the ATJ, or the terms of private commercial contracts, the 
OHADA Court for example, may find it easier to gain narrow, intermediate, 
and extensive authority because few actors beyond the relevant specialized 
community scrutinize or contest their rulings. In contrast, ICs may have more 
difficulty gaining any de facto authority for high-politics disputes, such as those 
involving military force or systemic human rights abuses, because a wide range 
of actors, such as executive branch officials, are watching the court and have the 
incentive and the means to challenge rulings contrary to their interests. 
Combining these institution-specific factors reveals a potential paradox. In 
low-politics cases, including many disputes over international economic rules, 
ICs may more easily achieve narrow or intermediate authority. Yet the 
abundance of alternatives available to address the concerns of businesses and 
lawyers can deprive ICs of cases needed to generate even narrow authority. For 
issue areas in which the political stakes are higher, in contrast, an IC may be the 
only available venue to raise legal violations, a reality that both attracts 
 
 59.  Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in Global Order, in 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 212 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi 
eds., 2012).  
 60.  See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203, 1218–26 (2011). 
 61.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35 , at 282–83. 
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complainants yet also makes it more challenging to establish IC authority with 
respondent states. 
B. IC Constituencies and Their Varied Interests 
We next explain how different constellations of constituencies can assist or 
impede ICs from gaining narrow, intermediate, and extensive authority. We 
begin by disaggregating the state into key sub-state actors—such as government 
officials, national courts, and administrative agencies—and then discuss private 
IC interlocutors, including legal experts, businesses, and NGOs. Constituency 
support is a key determinant of IC authority. Observers tend to take the 
support of constituencies for granted when such support exists. In practice, it is 
the lack of support that constrains IC authority. Variation that is rooted in the 
constituencies themselves thus provides an implicit aid or hurdle to creating and 
building IC authority. 
1. Key Constituencies 
Executive branches. Some scholars expect that ICs will garner narrow and 
intermediate authority by catering to the interests of executive branches.62 It is 
certainly more difficult for ICs to gain narrow authority when litigating 
governments strongly contest IC rulings. An IC’s disagreement with 
governments, however, is not always a problem. Executive officials sometimes 
dislike existing domestic laws or policies and thus may welcome IC rulings that 
order the end of those practices. The executive may also welcome losing a case 
when it can blame the court for disappointing domestic interest groups. Even 
when governments oppose a legal loss, an IC with extensive authority—and the 
support it thus enjoys from a wide audience—may make it more costly for 
executive officials to ignore or contest the ruling. Gathii makes this point, 
explaining that “human rights activists bring cases before the EACJ not 
necessarily or merely to get compliance, but to name and shame their 
governments for the alleged violations.”63 Whether the executive accepts 
adverse legal outcomes can vary by type of government, by issue area, by a 
court’s years of operation, and over time. This suggests that observers should 
pay careful attention to case-specific factors that explain variations in officials’ 
interests in IC rulings. Vinjamuri makes this point as she assesses the changing 
interest of governments after they self-refer cases to the ICC.64 
National courts are another key constituency for ICs. National judges 
interact with their international colleagues in multiple ways, including by 
referring cases to ECJ-style tribunals and by applying international law as 
interpreted by ICs in domestic litigation. Gaining support from national judges 
 
 62.  Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, 
“Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 280 (2011); Eric A. Posner & 
John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2005). 
 63.  Gathii, supra note 27, at 61. 
 64.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 280–83. 
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may help ICs achieve intermediate authority by mobilizing compliance partners 
even when executive branch officials or legislators reject specific international 
rulings. 
Extensive authority can be achieved only when IC jurisprudence is 
internalized by domestic legal constituencies—including national judges. As a 
formal matter, national judges may be obligated to refer certain cases or to 
apply international law as interpreted by an IC. When national judges 
habitually refer cases and apply IC rulings in these ways, it is tempting to 
assume that extensive authority exists. As we explained in part I, however, 
issues of hierarchy and legal culture complicate relations between international 
and national judges—in particular, the revision or displacement of existing legal 
practices. The more open national judiciaries are to such changes, the greater 
the likelihood that an IC can successfully establish intermediate and extensive 
authority. 
This insight is reflected in several contributions to this issue. For example, 
Dickerson finds uneven awareness of OHADA law and the OHADA Court 
among national judges.65 More consistent awareness may be a precondition to 
changing domestic practices in commercial law disputes. Huneeus finds that 
national judges in “neoconstitutional” legal systems are more likely to 
recognize the IACtHR’s authority to interpret legal norms common to human 
rights treaties and national constitutions than judges in other Latin American 
countries.66 Kelemen explores another variation, highlighting the impediments 
to judiciaries in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania serving as “Union courts” 
even as national judges in long-standing EU member states have readily 
accepted that role.67 
National administrative agencies can also be an important constituency for 
ICs, especially when other national actors resist or ignore IC rulings. Certain 
conditions must be in place, however, for IC rulings to resonate with agency 
officials. 
When administrators gain personally from violating the law—by accepting 
bribes or granting personal favors, for example—they have little reason to pay 
attention to IC decisions, making it all but impossible for the IC to gain narrow 
or intermediate authority.68 Administrators’ willingness to act outside the law 
also provides a ready alternative to international litigation. When, in contrast, 
administrative agencies operate as professionalized technical bodies, ICs may 
build narrow and intermediate authority by validating agency interpretations of 
the law and by providing cover when administrative decisions disappoint 
influential clients. ICs can also build intermediate authority by filling gaps in 
legal texts and by addressing the practical problems that agency officials face. 
 
 65.  Dickerson, supra note 35, at 79 
 66.  Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 187–201, 205–06. 
 67.  Kelemen, supra note 33, at 136. 
 68.  See, e.g., Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 24 (discussing the relationship between 
domestic administrative agencies and the ATJ).  
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Legal experts, including practicing lawyers and legal academics, are often 
central to the development of IC authority. These actors are generally less 
constrained, both legally and politically, than government officials, national 
judges, and agency administrators. Practitioners are also formally shielded by 
canons of professional responsibility and might benefit regardless of which 
party prevails in a particular suit.69 
Narrow or intermediate authority is often associated with a handful of legal 
practitioners who are frequent judicial interlocutors. In a number of instances, 
these institutional insiders helped to create or previously worked for the court 
before which they now appear, or they have professional connections to judges 
from participating in conferences and law teaching.70 In this symposium, Caserta 
and Madsen explain how this insider story was critical for the CCJ to gain 
narrow authority in its early original jurisdiction cases.71 
When ICs become busier, they tend to generate a specialized bar of repeat 
players with field-specific knowledge who provide advice to governments, 
businesses, and private litigants. Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig observe that the WTO 
Appellate Body rapidly gained extensive authority in large part due to the 
support of trade law experts.72 Conversely, Vinjamuri observes that although 
the ICC appears to enjoy extensive authority within the community of 
international criminal law experts, it still struggles to gain a basic requisite of 
narrow authority—custody over indicted defendants—in many high-profile 
cases.73 
Civil society groups, which range from public interest NGOs to industry 
associations, are also important contributors to the enlargement of IC authority. 
Public interest NGOs often file test cases—especially before human rights 
tribunals—that invite international judges broadly to interpret treaty texts or to 
expand principles only hinted at in earlier rulings.74 Such groups also monitor 
suits filed by private litigants, often requesting leave to file amicus briefs that 
amplify legal arguments or the practical consequences of alternative rulings. 
NGOs also serve as nodes for coordinating medium- and long-term litigation 
 
 69.  Mikael Rask Madsen, Reflexivity and the Construction of the International Object: The Case of 
Human Rights, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 259, 269–71 (2011). 
 70.  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-Law 
Associations in European Integration (1953–1975) (2009), in THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL 
POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 63, 63–89 (2009); Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, The ECHR and the Birth 
of (European) Human Rights Law as an Academic Discipline, in LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN 
LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 117, 117–35 (Bruno de Witte & Antoine Vauchez eds., 
2013); Antoine Vauchez, Introduction. Euro-lawyering, Transnational Social Fields and European 
Polity-Building, in LAWYERING EUROPE 1, 1–28 (Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte eds., 2013). 
 71.  See Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28, at 103–14.  
 72.  Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 243–47.  
 73.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 281.  
 74.  A concrete example is the Essex Human Rights Centre, which is one of the most active human 
rights law offices in Europe, especially with regard to Kurdish cases before the ECtHR. Rachel 
Cichowski, Civil Society and the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 77, 86 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 
2011). 
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strategies among litigants, attorneys, and sympathetic government officials who 
share similar interests and objectives. 
In this symposium, Gathii finds that the EACJ is forging connections with 
human rights bar associations and civil society groups,75 and Huneeus discusses 
links between the IACtHR and neoconstitutionalist lawyers.76 NGO advocacy 
can be a double-edged sword, however. Bold international decisions that 
endorse civil society arguments can build a profile among potential 
complainants, but they may also engender opposition from government officials 
and national judges who oppose such expansive rulings. A stark example, 
discussed by Huneeus, is Venezuela’s 2013 withdrawal from the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.77 
Whether businesses and firms contribute to building IC authority often 
depends upon cost-benefit calculations that weigh the risks of litigation against 
the risks of other dispute resolution options. Some ICs grant direct access to 
business actors to challenge violations of international economic law, but many 
ICs do not. Even when such access exists, firms engaged in transborder 
transactions are often deeply dependent on the cooperation of customs, tax 
agents, and other government officials, whom they therefore may be reluctant 
to sue even for flagrant violations of the law. As Caserta and Madsen explain, 
many private companies fear that they will face retaliation by Caribbean states 
in which they seek to do business if they file suits before the CCJ.78 In this 
environment, personal connections, negotiations, and other modes of dispute 
resolution are often far less risky. 
2. Constituencies and the Expansion of Authority 
ICs gain de facto authority through the iterative process of issuing decisions 
that key audiences recognize and respond to with consequential steps toward 
compliance.79 The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that the divergent 
interests of various IC constituencies may persist even if IC rulings are logically 
consistent and legally persuasive. These divergent interests suggest that there 
are multiple pathways for ICs to gain authority in fact. Some tribunals acquire 
intermediate legal authority when an entrepreneurial law firm or NGO decides 
to test the waters. For example, filing a complaint that triggers copy-cat cases 
may help a court develop its jurisprudence and connect with additional 
interlocutors. For other ICs, a pent-up demand for adjudication leads to a large 
number of early suits that create both opportunities and risks for international 
judges.80 For still other courts, complaints or referrals may come in fits and 
 
 75.  Gathii, supra note 27, at 38, 43 n. 50. 
 76. See generally Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39. 
 77.  Id. at 197–201. 
 78.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28 at 102. 
 79.  Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2447–48 (1991) (discussing 
how the ECJ built its authority incrementally through its interactions with national judges, government 
officials, and private litigants). 
 80.  This pattern exists in the Andean Community legal system. See Helfer & Alter, supra note 32, 
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starts until the judges develop relationships with the relevant constituencies. 
Even in the best-case scenario, it takes time for different constituencies to 
view ICs as viable venues for adjudicating their claims. It should thus come as 
no surprise that newer ICs often have a harder time gaining narrow and 
intermediate authority compared to ICs where litigants can refer to past 
practices as they decide which suits to pursue. There is, however, one way in 
which today’s nascent ICs may be advantaged compared to their predecessors. 
Older ICs generally operated in an informational vacuum and had to invent 
legal subject areas. Recently established courts, in contrast, can sometimes draw 
upon preexisting practices to more quickly establish their own de facto 
authority. In this symposium, Levi, Hagan, and Dezalay describe how the 
prosecutors for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
drew inspiration from, yet expanded beyond, the prosecutorial strategies used 
during the Nuremburg trials.81 Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig find that the GATT 
dispute settlement panels, despite facing many obstacles, over time created a 
body of legal interpretations that aided the WTO Appellate Body in quickly 
establishing extensive authority.82 These examples illustrate a more general 
point: it should be easier for ICs to gain authority when legal subject areas are 
well developed because potential litigants and other interlocutors predate the 
court’s creation. Vinjamuri’s analysis, however, raises the cautionary point that 
mercurial government interests can impede criminal courts because 
international prosecutors depend on state support, which, when given, may 
anger and undermine the ICC’s authority vis-à-vis other states.83 
C. Global, Regional, and Domestic Political Contexts 
This section considers how different political contexts help or hinder the 
creation and evolution of IC legal authority. Rulings that reinforce 
contemporary global, regional, and local political trends facilitate ICs in 
establishing and expanding narrow, intermediate, and extensive legal authority. 
But global, regional, and national political forces may push in different 
directions; IC decisions that reinforce one trend may generate opposition 
elsewhere that undermines the court’s authority in fact. The risks of running 
counter to global, regional, or local trends exist even when ICs apply the law as 
written, although the risks may be higher when ICs engage in expansionist 
lawmaking. 
1. Geopolitics and International Politics 
Geopolitical trends and practices produce global frameworks of power and 
ideas, which in turn influence and enable actions in international institutions 
 
at 8–11. 
 81.  Ron Levi, John Hagan & Sara Dezalay, International Courts in Atypical Political 
Environments: The Interplay of Prosecutorial Strategy, Evidence, and Court Authority in International 
Criminal Law, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 306. 
 82.  Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 261. 
 83.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 283–86.  
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and in regional and national settings. For example, when multilateral 
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
demand structural economic reforms, or when American and European donors 
link market access and financial assistance to the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies or to the protection of individual liberties, ICs tasked with 
enforcing free market and human rights rules gain tacit allies.84 Even if 
international institutions and foreign donors do not expressly demand that 
states comply with IC rulings, the public nature of court decisions means that a 
government’s implementation of those decisions sends a signal about the extent 
of its commitment to the institution’s or donor’s goals. As a result, even if 
powerful external actors do not push states to comply with IC judgments, courts 
that reinforce the objectives of these actors may more easily generate narrow, 
intermediate, and extensive legal authority. 
Synergy with powerful external actors can be a double-edged sword, 
however. Support for the post–Cold War objectives of economic liberalism and 
human rights have soured in much of the developing world. To the extent that 
ICs enforce rules that reflect externally supported goals that local audiences do 
not share, it may be difficult for the IC to acquire narrow and intermediate 
authority. This disjuncture between external and internal goals partly explains, 
for example, the demise of the Southern African Development Community 
Tribunal.85 
2. Regional Integration Politics 
Regionalism can help to mediate the pathologies created by disjunctures 
between global and local interests. Regional ICs too, even those modeled on 
courts in Europe, can sometimes provide a middle ground that both 
accommodates local laws and policies and diffuses foreign pressure. An 
example is the IP regime of the Andean Community, a regional integration 
project among four countries in South America. As is the case for most 
developing countries, Andean governments have faced significant external 
pressure to protect the IP rights of foreign businesses. The ATJ acted as a 
bulwark to uphold a distinctive Andean approach to IP and enabled domestic 
administrative agencies to push back against national governments that had 
caved to external pressure for stronger IP protection. The ATJ achieved narrow 
authority when the agencies complied with its rulings. This case-specific 
 
 84.  See, e.g., Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 7–8 (discussing expansion of the ATJ’s 
de jure authority following structural economic reforms in South America). 
 85.  See Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 870, 891 (2013) (contrasting the pro-democracy, pro-human-rights rhetoric adopted to garner favor 
with foreign donors with the pro-sovereignty preferences of political leaders in Southern Africa). Alter, 
Helfer, and Gathii further explain how Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe drew on his status as the 
country’s liberator and on anti-Western rhetoric to deter other political leaders in the region from 
opposing his attacks on the SADC Tribunal. See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & James Thuo 
Gathii, Backlash Against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Implications for 
Theories of Judicial Independence, (iCourts Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21; Duke Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 2015-19, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591837.  
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compliance, in turn, laid the groundwork for building intermediate and 
extensive authority in the specialized field of Andean IP law.86 
Regional politics are also relevant to ICs operating in the human rights and 
criminal law issue areas. Moravcsik, for example, attributes the success of the 
ECtHR to the social and political interests of member states in protecting 
liberal democracy in the context of the Cold War.87 Madsen generally concurs, 
and observes that changes in regional (geo)politics in the post–Cold War era 
are creating new challenges—and opportunities—for the ECtHR. 
In Africa, many political leaders have attacked the ICC for unfairly 
targeting international crimes on that continent. Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta is a leading champion of this charge, which many see as linked to his 
own, now-successful efforts to avoid prosecution.88 Yet Africa also has high-
profile ICC champions, including anti-apartheid activist Desmond Tutu.89 As 
Vinjamuri discusses, the regional battle over prosecutions is making it harder 
for the ICC prosecutor to garner support for arresting defendants.90 Without 
such support, prosecutions—and narrow authority—remain elusive. 
3. Domestic Politics 
Shifts in domestic politics interact with the geopolitical and regional 
contexts to influence IC authority. ICs that find fault with the actions of 
repressive regimes may endure a prolonged absence of narrow authority in the 
hope that a future government will repudiate the repressive practices of its 
predecessor. Courts that operate in these transitional circumstances may have 
little authority in fact for an extended period, but may then see a rapid 
expansion from narrow, to intermediate, to extensive authority when a new 
democratic government triggers a virtuous circle of sympathetic officials, 
impassioned attorneys, and a surfeit of claims focusing on violations 
attributable to a government no longer in power.91 A notable example is the 
rapid expansion of the IACtHR’s authority following the collapse of military 
regimes in Latin America.92 Similarly, Madsen observes that once France and 
the United Kingdom ended their decolonization struggles, accepting the 
ECtHR’s oversight became politically easier.93 
 
 86.  Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 32, at 3–4.  
 87.  Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 220 (2000). 
 88.  See African Union accuses ICC of ‘hunting’ Africans, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22681894.  
 89.  See Desmond Tutu, In Africa Seeking a License to Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/opinion/in-africa-seeking-a-license-to-kill.html?_r=0. 
 90.  Vinjamuri, supra note 35, at 283–86. 
 91.  See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011) (discussing the global spread of 
prosecutions for international crimes and violations of human rights, in part in response to IC rulings). 
 92.  See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 66–95 (2014). 
 93.  Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal 
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At other times, however, domestic legal and social forces may provoke a 
backlash against ICs. Huneeus discusses Venezuela’s opposition to IACtHR 
judgments against the policies of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.94 In 
Russia, President Putin has challenged ECtHR rulings condemning violations 
of LGBT rights to advance a broader “Eurasia” political strategy that includes 
appealing to nationalists and conservatives whose oppose such rights.95 
Political leaders in Africa and the Caribbean have also sought to bolster 
their domestic political support by enacting draconian criminal penalties for 
consensual same-sex conduct and LGBT advocacy.96 Heated domestic politics 
create challenges for ICs, such as the challenges to anti-gay laws filed before the 
CCJ and the EACJ.97 International judges who uphold anti-gay laws risk 
opprobrium from human rights NGOs and American and European 
governments. But ICs that rule against laws at odds with deeply held local 
values may see prolonged noncompliance and risk a retrenchment of their 
authority in fact. 
D. How International Judges Influence Contexts 
This symposium primarily explores how institutional and political factors 
exogenous to judicial decisionmaking affect IC authority. Yet the judges who 
serve on ICs often recognize the importance of these factors for establishing, 
expanding, or defending their court’s authority, and they take steps—both 
inside and outside the courtroom—to influence the contexts in which their court 
operates. 
Several articles in this symposium identify examples of international judges 
who have attempted to alter or strategically manipulate the contexts in which 
they operate. Kelemen and Madsen explain how Europe’s supranational courts 
consciously sought to expand their authority during their constitutional 
founding periods.98 Shaffer, Elsig, and Puig discuss how the WTO Appellate 
Body encouraged the development of an international trade bar by accepting 
amicus briefs and by allowing private lawyers to participate in WTO 
proceedings.99 Huneeus describes the IACtHR’s adoption of “conventionality 
 
Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN 
LAW AND POLITICS 43, 51–54 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011). 
 94.  Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 199–201. 
 95.  Timothy Snyder, Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (Mar. 1, 2014, 
11:15 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda.  
 96.  Somini Sengupta, Antigay Laws Gain Global Attention; Countering Them Remains Challenge, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/africa/antigay-laws-gain-global-
attention-countering-them-remains-challenge.html?_r=0. 
 97.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28, at 113 (discussing challenges to anti-gay immigration laws in 
Belize and Trinidad); Press Statement, Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law, Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act Challenged Before the East African Court of Justice (Apr. 25, 
2014), http://www.hrapf.org/sites/default/files/publications/14_04_23_cschrcl_press_release_upon_eacj_ 
reference_filing_final.pdf. 
 98.  Kelemen, supra note 33, at 138; Madsen, supra note 33, at 167. 
 99.  Shaffer, Elsig & Puig, supra note 36, at 254–55. 
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control” to induce national judges to follow Inter-American jurisprudence.100 
Caserta and Madsen discuss the extrajudicial strategies CCJ judges employed to 
connect with new audiences and encourage the filing of cases.101 Gathii 
considers how EACJ judges maintained close connections with regional bar 
associations.102 Hagan, Levi, and Dezalay show how prosecutorial strategies for 
aligning with key constituencies were developed at the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and the ICTY.103 And Vinjamuri examines prosecutorial choices that elate one 
audience while simultaneously raising suspicion among other audiences.104 
These examples illustrate that international judges can sometimes impact 
the context in which ICs operate. Yet there are significant limits to what judges 
can accomplish. No doctrinal innovation can alter the fact that only states can 
litigate before the WTO Appellate Body. Similarly, IACtHR judges can urge 
their domestic colleagues to apply Inter-American human rights norms, but 
some national judges will inevitably resist.105 And some contextual factors that 
impede IC authority are so deeply entrenched that judges can do little about 
them, as Dickerson explains in stressing the irrelevance of the OHADA Court 
and OHADA law to the informal economy in Francophone Africa.106 That said, 
international judges who understand the multiple contexts in which ICs operate 
are likely to be more effective in harnessing support for their respective 
institutions, as Madsen’s discussion of the ECtHR’s “legal diplomacy” reveals.107 
E. The Contextual Factors Investigated in This Symposium 
The contributors to this symposium explore how contextual factors 
influence the creation, growth, functioning, or diminution of IC authority by 
making comparisons across contexts. Table 2 provides a snapshot of their 
findings and related insights. It also serves as a guide for readers interested in 
looking across the symposium to explore how a particular contextual factor may 
or may not shape IC authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100.  Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers, supra note 39, at 203 (quoting Almonacid Arellano and 
others v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006)). 
 101.  Caserta & Madsen, supra note 28 at 108–14. 
 102.  Gathii, supra note 27, at 38. 
 103.  Levi, Hagan & Dezalay, supra note 81, at 295, 301. 
 104.  See generally Vinjamuri, supra note 35.  
 105.  Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts, supra note 19. 
 106.  Dickerson, supra note 35, at 68. 
 107.  See generally Madsen, supra note 33. 
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Table 2: Contextual Factors Explored in This Symposium 
 
Contextual  Factors 
 
Comparisons Explored for Different ICs 
 
 
 
 
IC design features 
 
WTO DS—GATT consent-based vs. WTO compulsory jurisdiction 
  
ICC—Self-referral vs. Security Council referral 
 
CCJ—Appellate jurisdiction replacing Privy Council vs. CARICOM original 
jurisdiction 
 
International criminal tribunals—Documentary strategy vs. witness-based 
strategy 
 
ECtHR—Optional vs. compulsory jurisdiction 
 
 
 
Alternatives to 
litigation 
 
ICJ—Informal dispute settlement by Islamic law states 
 
WTO DS—Dispute settlement under regional and bilateral trade agreements 
 
EACJ—Domestic political and legal alternatives  
 
OHADA—Informal norms  
 
CCJ—Political channels 
 
 
Varying subject 
matter  
 
EACJ—Economic disputes vs. human rights disputes 
 
ICJ—Diplomatic immunity vs. territorial disputes 
 
CCJ—Criminal law and human rights vs. economic disputes 
 
 
Varying domestic 
audiences 
 
IACtHR—Neoconstitutionalist countries (e.g., Colombia and Chile) vs. 
leftist states (e.g., Venezuela) 
 
EACJ—Economic actors vs. human rights NGOs 
 
OHADA—Formal vs. informal economy  
 
ECJ and ECtHR—Old vs. new member states; established democracies vs. 
post-communist democracies 
 
 
 
Varying geopolitical 
contexts 
 
ECJ—Cold War vs. post–Cold War setting 
 
CCJ—Privy Council (post-colonial) vs. CARICOM (neoliberal) 
 
WTO DS—Cold War vs. post–Cold War; rise of China 
ECtHR—Cold War vs. post–Cold War  
International criminal tribunals—Post–WWII occupation vs. post–Cold War 
period 
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V 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IC AUTHORITY AND IC POWER 
Our framework analyzes different categories of IC authority by reference to 
the practices of different audiences. As we have explained, we are chiefly 
interested in variation and change in these categories across ICs, issue areas, 
and time. Authority in fact, however, corresponds only roughly to whether an 
IC is powerful. For example, a court may have de facto authority in some of the 
disputes that it adjudicates but still not be a politically powerful institution 
because many legal violations are never brought to court or are the subject of 
rulings that are ignored. 
Powerful ICs, in contrast, have authority in fact that extends across a broad 
range of issues, states, and types of cases. For any legal issue, a change from 
narrow to intermediate to extensive authority expands the court’s power, 
defined as the ability to move governments and private actors in the direction 
indicated by the law.108 Yet this observation, and our framework overall, equates 
ICs that have extensive authority over a broad array of actors and disputes—
such as the ECJ and ECtHR in EU and human rights law—with ICs that have 
extensive authority vis-à-vis only a few actors or technical issues—such as the 
OHADA Court in some commercial disputes or the ATJ in IP cases. 
We view the scalability of our framework as an advantage for the study of 
ICs, whose authority in fact is often less extensive than their formal delegated 
authority. We recognize, however, that an IC that has extensive authority is not 
the same as a court that casts a large shadow over law and politics. To capture 
variation in IC power, we introduce a third dimension: the extent to which a 
court has narrow, intermediate, or extensive authority over a broad subject 
matter jurisdiction and many state parties. 
Figure 2 captures this third dimension by adding height to the circles of IC 
authority displayed in figure 1 above. The white cone corresponds to the white 
circles of figure 1, representing the IC’s formally delegated jurisdiction. The 
greater the height of the white cone, the broader its base and the more 
expansive the court’s formally delegated authority. For an IC with no de facto 
authority, the white cone would remain a blank space. ICs with some authority 
in fact would be represented by a shaded cone nested inside the white cone. 
Figure 2 offers the key insight that the size of the shaded cone varies along 
two dimensions—width and height—each of which can change independently of 
the other. The width of the shaded cone indicates whether an IC has narrow, 
intermediate, or extensive authority for a specific set of legal issues, such as 
diplomatic immunity disputes or cases involving state violence. A larger shaded 
cone suggests that more audiences recognize an IC’s authority for a specific set 
of issues and cases. To make the diagram more readable, the cone uses uniform 
shading to reflect extensive IC authority. The cone replicates figure 1 at the top 
 
 108.  Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, 
supra note 2, at 464, 466. 
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of the large shaded cone, to demonstrate that figure 1 is a slice of the cone. 
The height of the shaded cone shows the expansiveness of the jurisdiction 
that an IC actually exercises. The taller the shaded cone, the more powerful the 
IC. Because ICs seldom exercise the entire jurisdiction that states formally 
delegate to them, the shaded cone is depicted as smaller than the white cone. 
However, an IC might use judicial lawmaking to expand its own jurisdiction to 
the point that the shaded cone grows taller than the white cone. 
To illustrate variations of IC power, figure 2 includes three differently sized 
shaded cones that show three different ICs, each of which has extensive 
authority. The expansiveness of each court’s jurisdiction varies, with the result 
that each court’s influence also varies. 
The small cone “A” at the bottom of the diagram depicts an IC with 
extensive authority over the entire zone of its delegated jurisdiction. Yet 
because that jurisdiction is limited, the court has minimal power. An example is 
the Arab Investment Court, an IC whose jurisdiction is limited to reviewing 
nonimplementation of arbitral awards in disputes between Arab League states 
and firms. Even if the court develops narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority across its entire subject matter competence and all actors who have or 
might litigate disputes, it would still have very limited political influence.109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109.  See generally Walid Ben Hamida, The First Arab Investment Court Decision, 7 J. WORLD 
INVEST. & TRADE 699 (2006) (discussing the Arab Investment Court). 
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Figure 2: The Relationship of IC Authority to IC Power 
 
 
An IC can also be minimally powerful if its extensive authority is confined 
to a small fraction of a broader delegated jurisdiction. Cone “B” in the middle 
of figure 2 shows an IC with narrow, intermediate and extensive authority 
limited to an island within a wider subject matter jurisdiction. A good example 
of this is the ATJ in IP cases. Another type of island exists, as Huneeus’ 
discussion of the Inter-American system reveals, when only some of the 
countries that have signed on to an IC’s jurisdiction recognize its intermediate 
and extensive authority. 
In contrast, the larger shaded cone “C” represents an IC that has extensive 
authority extending over a wide-ranging subject matter and that encompasses 
all or most of its member states. The combination of extensive authority and 
expansive jurisdiction makes such a court both politically influential and 
effective. The ECJ and the ECtHR are examples of such courts. 
We drew these cones as monoliths. But our theory of authority allows for an 
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IC to have extensive authority over some issues, audiences, and countries and 
no authority over others that fall within the court’s formal authority. In reality, 
IC authority may thus resemble Swiss cheese. Vinjamuri’s contribution to this 
symposium, for example, identifies the absence of IC narrow authority for 
certain types of cases and audiences.110 The larger and more numerous the holes, 
the less the overall volume of IC authority and power. 
The third dimension of IC authority in figure 2 suggests that for an IC to 
become politically powerful it must: (1) have a formal or self-created 
jurisdiction that extends over multiple politically consequential issue areas, (2) 
exercise de facto authority that extends across the breadth of this jurisdiction, 
(3) extend this authority to at least intermediate and preferably also extensive 
authority, and (4) have few gaps in de facto authority. This topic merits further 
study. 
VI 
CONCLUSION: THE AUTHORITY OF ICS IN A COMPLEX WORLD 
This introduction has provided a comprehensive framework for analyzing 
and empirically assessing the de facto authority of ICs. The judicial nature of 
ICs makes them a distinct type of international institution. The formal power 
that states delegate to ICs establishes, as a legal matter, their right to rule. Yet 
because ICs operate in a context of regime complexity, in which there are 
competing and overlapping decisionmakers that lack an accepted hierarchy, 
turning that formal mandate into de facto authority raises political, legal, and 
practical challenges. 
We developed metrics to evaluate empirically whether ICs have narrow, 
intermediate, or extensive legal authority. According to our definition, ICs have 
authority when the litigants (narrow authority), the court’s compliance partners 
(intermediate authority), and the legal field (extensive authority) recognize the 
binding nature of IC rulings and undertake meaningful steps to give effect to 
those rulings. The symposium’s contributors apply these metrics to ten different 
ICs spanning economic, human rights, and mass atrocities issue areas, exploring 
how contextual factors shape an IC’s de facto authority. Important contextual 
factors include the availability of litigation alternatives, the discretionary 
decisions of prosecutors, the openness of domestic lawyers and judges to IC 
litigation, the compatibility of international and domestic laws and legal 
practices, and the geopolitics of the time. Some of these factors can be 
influenced by international judges, but many cannot. 
Finally, we examined the relationship between IC authority and IC power. 
Although authority is a form of power and the means through which ICs 
become powerful institutional actors, our investigation of varied IC authority 
demonstrates that the two concepts are in fact distinct. We conceive of a 
politically powerful IC as one that has attained narrow, intermediate, and 
 
 110.  See generally Vinjamuri, supra note 35. 
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extensive authority that encompasses a wide range of politically salient topics 
across its membership. Some of the ICs in this symposium have attained this 
level of influence. Others have narrow, intermediate, or even extensive 
authority, yet they nonetheless remain marginal political actors for some legal 
issues, or in some member states, or both. The contributors show, however, that 
even where an IC’s authority is circumscribed, it sometimes exerts influence 
over specific issue areas. 
A key theoretical benefit of our framework and this symposium is the 
conception of IC authority as varying by audience. This recognition surmounts 
a number of artificial binaries that commentators impose when they focus on 
only one IC or on only one audience. 
First, we challenge the binary claim that ICs either do or do not have 
authority. The contributors to this issue provide many examples of audiences 
and interlocutors differing in their embrace of IC rulings. This means that the 
support of the litigating parties—which may include a single lawyer, activist 
NGO, or sympathetic government—although necessary and sufficient to confer 
narrow authority in the case at hand—is not sufficient for an IC to gain 
intermediate or extensive authority. Conversely, opposition to an IC ruling by a 
single actor does not in itself signify that a court lacks any authority in fact. 
A second erroneous binary is the idea that legal authority resides either at 
the international or at the national level. By design, ICs exercise their legal 
authority in tandem with domestic actors, whether in a complementary or a 
contested fashion. Domestic actors who recognize an obligation to comply with 
IC rulings and engage in meaningful practices toward that end affirm IC 
authority without necessarily diminishing their own authority. 
Our separation of authority and legitimacy renders a third binary 
unsustainable. In particular, we contest the claim that an IC is either 
authoritative and legitimate on the one hand, or illegitimate and thus 
unauthoritative on the other. Longstanding debates about the compatibility of 
democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, and international judicial review have 
gained traction precisely because neither de jure nor de facto legal authority is 
the same as legitimacy. 
Finally, our framework suggests a strategy through which ICs can become 
politically influential institutions. International judges and their supporters 
should look beyond narrow authority and look outside the courtroom to build 
support among future compliance partners and the larger legal field. This 
further implies that it is not enough for international judges to focus on 
delivering high-quality legal rulings. Nor should international judges be satisfied 
once a legal ruling garners compliance. Building and maintaining IC authority 
remains a collective and fragile enterprise, one that is shaped by a range of 
contextual factors and requires the ongoing care and attention of a wide range 
of actors. 
 
